Beyond Off-the-Shelf: Reimagining India's Drone Strategy
As New Delhi commits $2 billion to domestic drone manufacturing, the challenge shifts from simply buying hardware to building agile partnerships that can keep pace with the rapid evolution of aerial warfare.
The Pre-requisite: Understanding India's Drone Ecosystem
To grasp the ongoing shift in India's military drone strategy, it is essential to understand the key terminology, the historical context of its drone acquisitions, and the institutions that govern this high-stakes domain.
KEY TERMS
- UCAV (Uncrewed Combat Aerial Vehicle) — A large, sophisticated, and typically high-altitude drone designed to carry and deploy significant ordnance, such as missiles and bombs (e.g., the U.S.-made MQ-9B Reaper).
- Tactical Drones — Smaller, often low-cost and attritable (expendable) drones used for battlefield roles like surveillance, artillery spotting, and direct attack with small warheads, including 'micro' and 'nano' categories.
- COTS (Commercial-Off-the-Shelf) — A procurement term for products and technologies that are commercially available and can be adapted for military use, allowing armed forces to leverage rapid innovation in the civilian sector.
- DAP (Defence Acquisition Procedure) — The primary policy document of the Ministry of Defence, first promulgated in 2002 and periodically updated, that governs all capital acquisitions, including major platforms like aircraft, ships, and large drone systems for the Indian armed forces.
BACKGROUND & TIMELINE
India's engagement with military drones began in the late 1990s, primarily through imports focused on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
- Early 2000s: The Indian armed forces began inducting Israeli systems like the IAI Searcher and Heron UAVs for high-altitude, long-endurance surveillance.
- 2015-2019: Discussions intensified within the defence establishment to acquire armed drones, leading to initial requests for the Predator-B (MQ-9B) from the United States.
- June 2020: The military standoff with China in Eastern Ladakh created an urgent operational demand for enhanced ISR capabilities, accelerating both imports and the push for indigenous development.
- August 2021: The Ministry of Civil Aviation notified the liberalised Drone Rules, 2021, replacing more restrictive regulations and simplifying procedures for civilian drone operations, which boosted the domestic manufacturing ecosystem.
- February 2022: To promote self-reliance under the 'Aatmanirbhar Bharat' initiative, the government banned the import of most foreign-made drones, with exceptions for R&D, defence, and security purposes.
- June 2023: During Prime Minister Narendra Modi's state visit to the U.S., an agreement for 31 MQ-9B High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) drones was announced, underscoring the continued need for high-end imported platforms.
- 2024: The government announced a plan to procure drones worth $2 billion from domestic manufacturers, marking the largest single investment in the indigenous drone industry and triggering a re-evaluation of procurement models.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Several bodies shape India's drone strategy, from policy formulation to development and deployment.
- Ministry of Defence (MoD): The apex government body responsible for formulating defence policy, overseeing the armed forces, and managing the entire capital and revenue procurement process through frameworks like the DAP.
- Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO): India's premier military R&D agency, responsible for developing indigenous defence technologies. Its drone projects include the Rustom series (later named TAPAS-BH) and other tactical UAVs.
- The Armed Forces: The Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force are the end-users. They formulate the Staff Qualitative Requirements (SQRs) that define the technical and operational parameters for any new equipment, including drones, and are responsible for their operational deployment.
The Core Analysis: From Transactional Buys to Capability Partnerships
India's planned $2 billion investment in its domestic drone industry is a clear statement of intent. However, the effectiveness of this capital infusion hinges on a critical question: can India's traditional defence procurement architecture, designed for long-gestation platforms like fighter jets and tanks, adapt to the blistering pace of drone technology? The emerging consensus, informed by recent global conflicts, suggests that a fundamental shift from one-time purchases to continuous, collaborative partnerships is necessary.
The Challenge of the Current Procurement Model
The traditional defence acquisition process, governed by the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP), is structured for procuring large, high-value platforms with service lives spanning decades. A fighter jet acquired in 2015 remains a frontline asset in 2026. This model is fundamentally misaligned with the nature of tactical drones. According to Adya Madhavan of the Takshashila Institution, a tactical drone purchased today can become obsolete in two to three years. The primary driver of this rapid obsolescence is the dynamic electronic warfare (EW) environment; an adversary can often analyse a new drone's signals and develop effective jammers in just six to eight weeks. This reality means a procurement process that takes years to finalise a contract is delivering a potentially outdated system on day one.
This procedural rigidity was a key concern highlighted by the Lt Gen D.B. Shekatkar (Retd.) Committee in 2016, which recommended streamlining defence procurement to enhance combat capability. The current framework is inherently transactional: the Ministry of Defence (MoD) identifies a requirement, issues a tender, and procures a product. This buyer-seller relationship leaves little room for the continuous iteration that drone warfare demands. When Ukrainian forces found their drone signals being jammed, the solution was to work directly with engineers to replace radio links with fibre-optic cables—a level of agility impossible under rigid, multi-stage procurement rules.
How Recent Conflicts Reshaped Drone Warfare
The Russia-Ukraine war has served as a global laboratory for modern drone employment. While public attention often focuses on large UCAVs like the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2, the war has demonstrated the immense tactical value of smaller, cheaper, and more attritable systems. Ukraine's widespread use of commercial first-person-view (FPV) drones, retrofitted with small warheads, has proven highly effective against armoured vehicles. This trend underscores that military drone innovation is now inextricably linked to the civilian technology market.
This creates a strategic and economic asymmetry. As seen in conflicts involving Iran-backed groups, the cost of intercepting a low-cost drone (which may cost a few thousand dollars) with a sophisticated air defence missile (which can cost millions) is unsustainably high. This shift towards massed, low-cost systems is mirrored in the strategic thinking of other major military powers. The U.S. Department of Defense's 'Replicator Initiative', for instance, aims to deploy thousands of autonomous systems by 2025 to counter peer adversaries, acknowledging that volume can be a quality of its own. This reality necessitates a procurement model that prioritizes volume, cost-effectiveness, and rapid integration of commercial innovations.
Government Reforms and Their Limitations
The Indian government has taken steps to adapt its policies. The MoD, in its draft Defence Acquisition Procedure, has included provisions for procuring commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems, theoretically allowing the armed forces to bypass lengthy development cycles. Furthermore, initiatives like Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX), launched by the Defence Innovation Organisation in April 2018, have been established to foster an ecosystem of innovation by engaging startups. The Defence Procurement Manual (DPM), which governs revenue expenditure, also allows for financial buffers to cover unforeseen repair and upgrade costs.
However, the core limitation, as highlighted in analysis by the Takshashila Institution, is that these measures operate within the old transactional paradigm. They streamline parts of the process but do not change the fundamental relationship between the military and the manufacturer. The underlying assumption remains that the government buys a finished product. This model does not create a framework for the armed forces and the drone-maker to work together continuously to upgrade software or harden electronic systems as threats evolve. The problem is not a lack of provisions, but a structural model that treats procurement as a single event rather than an ongoing process.
The Proposed Alternative: A 'Managed Service' Model
A more suitable approach for tactical drones would be to shift from purchasing hardware to contracting for a capability, often described as a 'managed service' or 'performance-based logistics' model. In this framework, the armed forces would not simply buy a fleet of drones. Instead, they would enter into a long-term agreement with a domestic manufacturer for the delivery of a specific capability—for instance, 'X hours of live surveillance feed per month' or 'the ability to neutralise Y number of targets'.
This model, analogous to a corporation leasing its computer systems with an integrated contract for maintenance and upgrades, offers several advantages. For the drone industry, it provides predictable revenue streams, justifying sustained R&D investment. For the armed forces, it ensures an assured supply of drones, guaranteed performance, and clear pathways for technology upgrades. Most importantly, it transforms the relationship from a transactional one to a collaborative partnership. The manufacturer becomes a co-developer, incentivised to work constantly with the end-user to adapt the system to emerging threats. The $2 billion commitment provides the financial leverage to architect these new contracts, prioritising sustained capability over a one-off delivery.
The Conclusion: Architecting an Agile Future
The re-evaluation of India's drone procurement strategy is a critical test of the defence establishment's ability to adapt to the changing character of modern warfare. The immediate catalyst is the planned $2 billion procurement from domestic firms, the largest single investment in India's drone ecosystem. How these contracts are structured will set a precedent for years, making the translation of this investment into sustainable capability a matter of urgent national security, especially given persistent challenges on India's borders.
In the near term, initial procurements over the next one to two years will likely proceed under the existing Defence Acquisition Procedure, but with bespoke clauses attempting to build in flexibility for upgrades. A full transition to a 'managed service' model, however, will require significant bureaucratic reform. This could culminate in the next iteration of the DAP, projected around 2027-28, featuring a dedicated chapter on acquiring 'rapidly evolving technologies' based on these experiences. Future defence budgets may consequently see a shift from large, one-time capital outlays for drones towards smaller, but consistent, revenue expenditures for capability contracts.
Adopting a partnership model requires a significant operational shift within the Ministry of Defence—from a compliance-driven procurement process to a more agile, trust-based system of co-development with the private sector. It challenges the traditional separation between the user (military) and the developer (industry). For the 'Aatmanirbhar Bharat' policy, this represents a necessary evolution: moving beyond the goal of simply manufacturing in India to the more ambitious objective of innovating continuously in India. Ultimately, whether India can successfully transition from a drone buyer to a drone co-developer will be a powerful indicator of its larger capacity to build a modern, technologically advanced industrial base.